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Negotiating Around Tradeoffs 
Alternative Institutional Designs 
for Climate Finance 
ECP Report No. 10/ December 2010 
Arunabha Ghosh∗ 
Introduction 
Securing a credible pool of climate finance is one of the lynchpins for successful negotiations in 
the climate regime. Several initiatives are already underway and more are being planned. 
However, existing mechanisms have failed to deliver the level of funding required for the task, 
even as developing countries have clearly expressed dissatisfaction with the governance of 
climate finance. The Copenhagen climate summit in December 2009 offered new promises of 
funds, of up to $100 billion per year by 2020. Since then the UN Secretary General’s High-
Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing has concluded that ‘it is challenging but 
feasible to meet that goal’.1 The funds will have to come from various sources, public and 
private, multilateral and bilateral. But there is little clarity on how additional funds will be 
channelled or the options for institutional design for the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. This 
paper is a summary of findings and recommendations from a longer research report on climate 
finance.2 The primary question it asks is: how would different governance priorities affect the 
institutional arrangements for a credible financing mechanism in the climate regime? The paper 
argues that tradeoffs are inevitable in climate finance negotiations, so it is important to 
recognise them upfront and organise negotiations around the priorities that different sets of 
countries identify. Such a process generates alternative institutional designs, each offering a 
different balance of voice in governance, scale of funding, and timely action. 
1. Context – a shift in power? 
The focus of this brief is institutional design. While climate finance will come in different 
phases (fast start finance followed by long-term funding), many governance-related questions 
remain unanswered. Before we assess those questions, it is worth noting six imperatives for 
climate finance. 
• The scale of funding required is vastly greater than what the existing climate regime or 
other international environmental agreements have been able to generate so far.3  
                                                     
∗ Arunabha Ghosh is CEO of the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), India. He is also 
an Associate at the Global Economic Governance Programme, Oxford; Faculty Associate at the Smith 
School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford; and Associate Fellow at the Governance of Clean 
Development Project at the University of East Anglia. He is a member of the working group of the Royal 
Society’s Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative. This study was originally prepared as a 
briefing paper for the European Climate Platform Seminar on Climate Finance, in Brussels, 26 October 
2010.  
1 UN (2010), 5. 
2 Ghosh (2010a). 
3 According to www.climatefundsupdate.org less than $27 billion has been pledged, and $9 billion 
deposited since 2000. 
2 | ARUNABHA GHOSH 
• Funding is needed for both mitigation and adaptation. The less effort is taken to mitigate 
the emission of GHGs into the atmosphere, the more will have to be spent on adaptation 
activities due to the adverse consequences of climate change.  
• A third issue is additionality. If public resources leverage private funding, will all of the 
private finances be considered towards assessing compliance by rich countries? Further, 
developing countries are legitimately concerned that funds intended for development 
assistance will be reclassified as adaptation expenditure.  
• Funds for mitigation activities are needed for deploying existing technologies as well as 
for developing new ones. In the absence of funding for technology transfer, there is the 
risk that poor countries will end up at the wrong end of a new technological divide. 
• Market uncertainty affects available funding. Globally, there was a surge in investments 
for renewables-based energy from 2004 to 2007. Whereas only 8 per cent of additional 
capacity in 2003 was in renewables, by 2008 this share had risen to 25 per cent.4 This 
upward trend was halted by the economic crisis. By Q3 2008, the four-quarter moving 
average was on a downward trend. Estimates suggest that investments fell by at least 20 
per cent in 2009. While market-based funding has slowed down, public funding support 
has not filled the gaps.  
• Meanwhile, emerging economies have become important actors in another respect, 
namely investments in clean technologies. China and India have the highest and fifth 
highest installed renewable energy capacity respectively. During 2004–08, Brazil, China, 
and India experienced compound annual growth rates in renewable energy investments of 
171 per cent, 104 per cent, and 52 per cent respectively.5 The Copenhagen negotiations 
also signalled the ability of emerging powers to co-ordinate their negotiating strategies 
and to drive a hard bargain.6 The danger presented by the Copenhagen process is that if, 
in pursuit of a flexible set of agreements, major emitters strike bilateral and plurilateral 
deals, what incentives will they have to provide financing and technology to poorer 
countries? 
2. How to assess the governance of climate finance? 
In other words, the problem for climate negotiators is how to harness the power shifts while 
balancing the varied financial imperatives. A better understanding of these imperatives depends 
on, first, identifying funding channels; secondly, identifying the key concerns of parties; thirdly, 
developing a framework of governance functions to reflect these concerns; and fourthly, 
evaluating the funds based on such a framework.  
Funding for climate-related activities comes from multiple sources. Six funding channels can be 
identified.  
• Multilateral development bank (MDB) funds  
• United Nations funds 
• Government-promoted funds 
• Public-private investment funds 
                                                     
4 UNEP, Sustainable Energy Finance Initiative, New Energy Finance (2009).  
5 REN21 (2009). 
6 For a detailed discussion on potential shifts in the climate regime’s architecture and governance, see 
Ghosh (2010b).  
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• Carbon markets 
• Unilateral fiscal support  
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
Each category, in turn, has numerous funds raised and managed by different countries and 
institutions. The funding sources might be diverse, but in many instances their governance 
structures are linked and even overlapping. MDBs manage many of the multi-donor trust funds 
(MDTFs). But even those that are managed by UN agencies have some degree of MDB 
involvement. Government-supported funds are managed by donor ministries but some also 
route a portion of the funding via existing MDTFs. Further, public-private investment funds are 
often under MDB management, but representation in these funds varies depending on whether 
there is only one country contributing, or several. The different carbon markets have their own 
governance arrangements, but they do interact when credits are purchased in one market 
towards fulfilling obligations under other schemes. Only unilateral fiscal support initiatives can 
be regarded as having entirely independent governance. The complexity of different sources of 
funding and the links between them are illustrated in Figure 1. 
Next, we summarise the key concerns that contributing and beneficiary countries have in 
climate finance negotiations. 
  
|
Funding sources are many but their governance is often interlinked
ETF-IW
(UK)
ICI
(Germany)
GCCA 
(EC)
IFCI 
(Australia)
HI
(Japan)
WB
SREP
PPCR
SCF
CIFs
BioCF-1
MDGF
CDCF
CPF
CTF
KPAF
China
USA
Japan
S. Korea
EU
Australia
Germany
S. Arabia
India
France
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Canada
Italy
Norway
Mexico
S. Africa
Spain
Indonesia
CDM
JI
Voluntary
Secondary 
CDM
EU-ETS
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CCX
RGGI
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UK-ETS
GEFUNDPAFBEIB AfDB
FIP
FCPF
UN-
REDD
LDCFGEF-TF
SCCF
SPA
BioCF-2
CBFFGEEREF
FA
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DCF
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UCF
SpCF-2
SpCF-1
CFE
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Public-Private Funds
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Govt.-promoted funds
UN funds
Direct funding
Indirect funding
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SOURCE: Adapted from ClimateFundsUpdate.org; added to, modified and updated by author
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Contributing countries 
• No free lunch: Annex I countries are unwilling to contribute any money unless 
developing countries, particularly the large ones that are now also major emitters, also 
promise to undertake mitigation actions.  
• Competitiveness and transfers: Developed countries also fear that flows of finance and 
technology to emerging economies will pose the risk of them losing their own 
competitive edge in clean technologies. 
• No new bureaucracy: Rich countries are keen to use existing channels of funding rather 
than create new institutions. Contributing countries also argue that creating new 
institutions will only add to the bureaucracy and transaction costs in disbursing money 
when the landscape is already populated with so many funds.  
• Monitoring projects is critical: Verifying that the money is being used for the purposes 
outlined in each fund and that the purported emissions reductions are both credible and 
additional remains a major concern for contributors.  
Beneficiary countries 
• Climate finance is not aid: For Non-Annex I parties, the most important argument in 
climate finance negotiations is that financial flows cannot be treated as aid. On ethical, 
the reasoning is that poor countries have not hitherto contributed to the problem of 
climate change but they are expected to bear the brunt of the adverse impacts of a rise in 
average temperatures. The political reasoning draws upon the experience with ODA and a 
long history of unmet promises.7  
• Climate finance must not displace aid: A related concern for developing countries is 
that, even if the transfer is not called ‘aid’, it will simply crowd out assistance for other 
development goals. This raises questions about how climate financing will be counted.8  
• A single mechanism to govern: Developing countries demand a comprehensive 
financing mechanism under the UNFCCC to operate under the ‘authority and guidance, 
and be fully accountable to the COP’.9 A single mechanism under the COP is attractive to 
developing countries not only for controlling its governance but in accessing the funds 
more directly.  
• Adaptation is also an imperative: Poor countries fear that financing for adaptation will 
be treated as an afterthought or a ‘poor cousin of mitigation’ in climate negotiations. The 
Copenhagen Accord promised balanced allocation of the fast start funding of $30bn until 
2012. It also suggests that funding for adaptation will be prioritised in LDCs, small island 
developing states (SIDS), and Africa.10 But while the Accord puts a figure of $100bn per 
year by 2020 for ‘meaningful mitigation actions’, there is no figure ascribed to adaptation 
purposes beyond 2012.  
• More grants, less conditionality: Funding can be delivered as non-repayable grants, as 
concessional loans, as direct investments in projects, or as guarantees to insure against 
project risk. A new financing mechanism has to be flexible in order to offer a range of 
                                                     
7 Ghosh and Woods (2009), pp.456-457. 
8 Stadelmann, Roberts, and Huq (2010) outline eight ways to define the baselines above which 
contributions could be considered additional. Also see Brown, Bird, and Schalatek (2010), pp.3-6 on the 
implications for ODA of alternative definitions of ‘additionality’.  
9 G77 and China (2008). 
10 Copenhagen Accord, 18 December 2009, para. 8. 
NEGOTIATING AROUND TRADEOFFS | 5 
different financial products.11 But beneficiary countries do not want to become burdened 
by debt in order to undertake adaptation or mitigation actions. A related concern is about 
the kind of conditionality that might be imposed on beneficiary countries, depending on 
the type of financial instrument on offer.  
• Monitoring of funding is equally critical: The Bali Action Plan recognises that the 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) taken by developing countries have to 
be ‘supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner’.12 From the point of view of developing 
countries, this provision not only makes their actions contingent on the funds provided 
but also means that the funds need to be monitored properly. 
The contradictions among stakeholders’ needs suggest that the governance of climate finance 
cannot necessarily satisfy all conditions for all parties. Yet, the priorities of the parties point 
towards specific governance functions that a financing mechanism ought to fulfil. These 
governance functions and the criteria embedded in each are outlined below. For each function, 
33 climate funds were analysed to reveal patterns that either satisfy some parties or are sources 
of discontent for others. 
Making decisions 
The choice of institutions matters above all else because countries’ say in and influence over 
decisions vary. The GEF became an ‘operating entity’ of the UNFCCC by default because, 
when created, there was no alternative channel.13 Since then funding sources have expanded, 
the scale of funding required has increased, and the number of institutions involved in climate 
finance has multiplied. The evaluation of alternative institutions and funds with regard to how 
decisions are governed will be based on: 
• Administration, or which agency has the authority to manage the funds; 
• Representation, or which countries (or non-governmental actors) are members of the 
main decision-making body; 
• Decision rules, whether by votes or consensus or a mix of both; 
• Consultation, or whether experts, beneficiary countries, and other stakeholders are 
consulted in the design and operation of the funds. 
 
The results from the analysis of 33 funds are summarised in Table 1. 
  
                                                     
11 Ghosh and Watkins (2009). 
12 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1b(ii) (emphasis added). 
13 Gomez-Echeverri and Müller (2009). 
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Table 1: Few funds have equitable decision-making procedures 
 
 Administration Representation Decision Consultation 
 
MDB Mostly World Bank Recent initiatives 
give beneficiary 
countries balanced 
representation 
 
Mostly reliance on 
consensus 
Partnership 
forums; expert 
groups  
UN World Bank also 
plays role in GEF 
 
 
 
 
Only KPAF gives 
developing 
countries more 
seats; civil society 
in CBFF and UN-
REDD 
Consensus, in the 
absence of which 
voting rules vary 
NGO networks; 
also indigenous 
people for forestry-
based funds 
Government-
promoted 
Contributing 
country agencies 
Poor countries 
seldom involved in 
fund design 
No voting rights 
for beneficiary 
countries 
Consultation 
procedures vary 
Public-
private 
World Bank 
manages most 
Only contributing 
countries and 
private sector 
participants 
No voting rights 
for beneficiary 
countries 
Mostly expert 
advisory groups 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
Securing commitments 
Although references to financing appear regularly in the climate regime’s decisions, there is still 
no legally enforceable set of commitments that promise a certain amount of funding. In order to 
evaluate funding sources in terms of securing commitments, four criteria can be identified: 
• Adequacy, or the amount of funding that each source offers and whether it meets 
expected needs; 
• Additionality, or whether resources will be additional to sums already committed in each 
fund; 
• Predictability, or whether funds will be committed with guarantees so that contributing 
countries do not backtrack in future; 
• Appropriateness, or whether the funds strike a balance between public and private sources 
and between the designated uses for the resources (mitigation versus adaptation). 
 
The results are as summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Pledges unlikely to be additional or predictable, especially during an economic crisis 
 
 Adequacy Additionality Predictability Appropriateness 
 
MDB Level of ambition 
low so far 
Not if counted as 
ODA or if 
concessional loans 
are discounted 
 
Depend on 
voluntary 
contributions 
Mostly for 
mitigation 
UN Very low pledges Unclear status for 
GEF funds post-
2012 
Depend on 
voluntary 
contributions; 
KPAF depends on 
CDM market 
 
Greater number of 
funds for adaptation 
but very low pledges 
Government-
promoted 
Mostly because of 
HI 
Counted as ODA Purely voluntary 
contributions 
Mix of adaptation 
and mitigation  
 
Public-
private 
Low Not ODA but not 
for additional 
actions in 
developing 
countries 
Depend on state of 
carbon markets, 
level of carbon 
price 
Unlikely to flow to 
LDCs; private sector 
leverage during 
crisis is difficult 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
Ensuring disbursements 
 
Table 3: Disbursements low and a mix of loans and grants, mostly for projects 
 
 Scale Instrument Modality Conditionality 
 
MDB Tiny fraction of 
pledges 
Grants and 
concessional loans 
Projects but 
programmatic and 
budget support also 
envisioned for CIFs 
 
Recipient-
developed strategies 
UN Greater 
disbursements but 
scale is small 
Mostly grants Mostly projects; 
KPAF can support 
programmes 
 
Meant to be 
country-driven; but 
also bureaucratic 
hurdles 
Government-
promoted 
The largest funds 
see few 
disbursements 
Mix of loans and 
grants 
Mostly projects Mostly through 
normal bilateral 
channels, or for 
specific countries 
 
Public-
private 
Bias towards large 
projects or a few 
large countries 
Investments and 
guarantees 
CPF and UCF aim 
for programmatic 
support 
Technical 
competence of host 
country important; 
CDCF focus on 
small countries; 
CFE preference for 
short lead times 
 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
The gap between commitments and disbursements has been a source of mistrust between 
contributing and beneficiary countries. The issue is not restricted only to the amount of funds 
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provided. It also concerns the manner in which resources flow and under what conditions. 
Disbursements in a climate finance mechanism can be judged on the following terms: 
• Scale, or whether resources tend to flow towards large or small projects or large or small 
countries; 
• Instruments, or whether the funds deliver resources through one or several different 
financing instruments (investments, loans, grants, and guarantees); 
• Modality, or the manner in which governments and private entities in beneficiary 
countries can access the funds (for projects, for sectoral programmes, or directly for 
government budgets); 
• Conditionality, or the kind of pre-conditions that are imposed by contributing countries. 
The analysis of disbursements for the funds and the low scale of ambitions are captured in Table 
3 and Figure 2, respectively. 
Figure 2.
 
Monitoring performance 
The last governance function relates to monitoring projects and financial flows, verifying and 
reviewing them, and the procedures for promoting compliance. These are politically fraught 
questions and no mechanism yet exists that performs all of these tasks. Nevertheless, it is useful 
to explore alternative design options based on: 
Reporting funds, or what kind of reporting format the fund adopts; 
|
MDB Funds
UN Funds
Government-
promoted 
Funds
$mn, figures updated as of August 2010
Disbursed
25
Deposited
1111
Pledged
6787
Source: Author's calculation based on data available at http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/graphs-statistics/pledged-deposited-disbursed; 
Accessed 13 August 2010
Disbursed
5684
Deposited
6395
Pledged
16976
~~
Disbursed
1382
Deposited
1649
Pledged
3073
NOTE 1: UK Environmental Transformation Fund – International Window: Funds channelled through CIFs, FCPF and CBFF, hence not included separately
NOTE 2: Strategic Climate Fund (MDB): Funds channelled through PPCR, FIP and SREP, hence not included separately
NOTE 3: For the Adaptation Fund (UN), the money raised from the monitezation of CERs is included under pledges
NOTE 4: Funds for the Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) are sourced from the GEF Trust Fund
NOTE 5: For the GEF Trust Fund, only pledges/deposits under the climate change focal area for the fourth and fifth funding replenishments are included
Many recent initiatives for climate financing but low ambitions so far
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• Reporting performance, or who has the responsibility for reporting on project outcomes; 
• Verification, or whether independent agencies are tasked with verifying reports and 
certifying projects; 
• Review, or whether the funds also undertake political reviews and overall evaluations; 
• Compliance, or whether there are any procedures in place to enforce commitments, both 
for providing resources and for meeting project aims. 
For monitoring both the flow of funds and how effectively they are used, the different channels 
reveal patterns captured in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Little attention to monitoring and enforcing financial flows 
 
 Reporting 
funds 
Reporting 
performance 
 
Verification Review Compliance 
MDB Annual 
reporting but 
lags in data 
Each MDB 
follows its 
own M&E 
procedure 
 
Unclear Three-yearly 
impact 
evaluation 
Unclear 
UN Online 
database for 
GEF 
Secretariat 
and agencies 
monitor GEF 
Evaluation 
Office but no 
separate 
verification of 
fund 
contributions 
M&E results 
to GEF 
Council 
Unclear but 
unlikely any 
compliance 
procedure for 
funding 
 
Government-
promoted 
Ad hoc Monitoring 
capacity is key 
criterion 
Unclear Unclear Voluntary 
contributions, 
so no 
compliance 
procedure 
 
Public-
Private 
Some data in 
World Bank 
reports but not 
comprehensive 
Some funds 
help build 
methodologies 
Independent 
verification for 
many funds but 
no separate 
verification of 
fund 
contributions 
 
Unclear Many are single 
country-led, so 
no compliance 
mechanism 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
 
3. What can climate finance learn from other regimes? 
Notwithstanding the challenges facing climate funds, important funding initiatives exist in other 
regimes as well, such as the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol; the Global Fund for 
HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis; the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
(GAVI); and the World Bank’s Trust Fund for the Global Agricultural and Food Security 
Programme (GAFSP). Their governance also offers valuable lessons for climate finance. 
• First, multiple funding sources are necessary but not sufficient. These funding initiatives 
have all had the aim of significantly increasing the scale of funding available while 
making sure that it is additional to other development assistance. The main advantage of 
vertical funds is the ability to raise more resources through both public and private 
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sources. Moreover, contributors to the Global Fund and the GFASP include large, 
developing, and emerging economies as well. Nevertheless, the sustainability of funding 
remains in doubt even when private sources are tapped.  
• Secondly, targeting funds improves outcomes but also reduces flexibility. The relative 
success of these funds is at least partly due to their focus on specific diseases or 
technologies – but there are caveats. Whereas the Montreal Protocol targeted one specific 
set of pollutants, the UNFCCC covers a wide range of greenhouse gases. At the same 
time, vertical health funds are generally criticised because they target specific diseases or 
pollutants at the cost of under-funding systemic infrastructure. Under GAVI, for instance, 
where health systems support has recently been provided, recipient countries are further 
burdened by the need to prepare additional plans to secure funding.  
• Thirdly, direct access to funding is achievable. The GAFSP’s main lesson for climate 
finance is its focus on providing funds much more quickly than existing bilateral and 
multilateral cycles. Such funding is also expected to be more flexible, giving countries a 
chance to restructure their programmes midway, depending on outcomes. In both ways, 
the programme hopes to make aid flows more predictable, something that the various 
climate funds have not achieved. The Montreal Protocol’s fund also permitted 
programmatic funding, which allowed for a more strategic orientation away from ozone-
depleting substances. 
• Fourthly, the legitimacy of governance depends on both rules and practice. All the funds 
have balanced representation of rich and poor countries and many also formally include 
other actors such as international organisations and civil society representatives. Yet 
tensions persist on the terms of funding and regarding decision-making rules. Recipient 
countries remain sceptical of concessional loans as opposed to grants, fearing the 
conditionalities attached to them and the size of the potential debt burden. In climate 
change, where estimates of funding requirements vary widely, even low-interest loans can 
become burdensome. The lessons from the health-related funds show that while private 
sector participation can increase the available funds, there is no easy transition to 
recipient countries taking on larger co-payment obligations. Balanced representation on 
boards and expert committees can create an illusion of legitimacy if consensus-based 
voting rules ensure that contributing countries still maintain effective vetoes over the 
allocation of resources.  
• Fifthly, monitoring and evaluation remains a key concern even for targeted funds. The 
use of performance-based indicators as the basis of reward schemes has led to the 
perverse outcome of inflating immunisation figures in GAVI recipient countries. There 
have been calls for independent monitoring and tracking of vaccination coverage and 
common reporting structures for developing countries. Monitoring and evaluation has 
also remained a problem with the Montreal Protocol, due to inflated project costs and lack 
of independent audits. 
4. What options for institutional design? 
Noting the lessons learned in other regimes and the outstanding concerns of parties in the 
climate regime, four institutional architectures for the governance of climate finance can be 
considered (these are summarised in Table 5). These schematic options have one principle in 
common, namely explicit recognition of the trade-offs between different priorities in climate 
change financing. The following discussion sets out the key elements of each design option, its 
merits and demerits, and its implication for the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (GCF), 
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envisaged in the Copenhagen Accord and through which a ‘significant portion’ of new and 
additional funding will flow.14  
 
Table 5: Options for institutional design for governing climate finance   
 A: Consolidate 
and specialise 
 
B: Create and 
legitimise 
C: Innovate and  
de-bureaucratise 
D: Separate and 
indigenise 
Focus Voice 
 
Coordination 
Scale of funding 
 
Voice 
Scale of funding 
 
Hastening actions 
 
Adaptation is key 
Elements No new institutions 
 
Reform of MDBs 
 
Aim for budget 
support 
 
MRV under 
UNFCCC 
New Low Carbon 
Global Fund 
 
Increased voice 
 
Upfront financing 
commitments 
 
Programmatic 
support with 
flexible, project 
financing 
 
MRV by public-
private agencies 
Innovative financing 
 
MDBs face 
competition 
 
Mainly project 
financing 
 
MRV by market 
actors 
No overarching 
mechanism 
 
Self-reliance and 
innovative finance 
 
MDBs underwrite risk 
 
Legal commitments 
for adaptation funding 
under UNFCCC 
 
MRV needs domestic 
capacity 
Merits Beneficiaries get 
more voice 
 
Contributors’ 
preference for 
existing agencies 
maintained 
G77 and China’s 
formal demands met 
 
Contributors might 
accept if precedents 
from Montreal 
Protocol, Global 
Fund, GAVI, and 
GAFSP are noted 
Contributors do not 
have to contribute 
greater public funds 
if private markets fill 
the gap 
 
Emerging economies 
secure greater 
financial flows for 
technological 
upgrading 
Political feasibility 
high, especially for a 
deal between rich and 
emerging countries 
 
Adaptation finally gets 
separate attention – 
poorest countries’ 
demands met 
Demerits Innovative 
financing limited 
Political feasibility 
low given funding 
requirements 
UN-centred 
governance declines 
 
Adaptation funding 
suffers 
Small countries 
potentially lose in 
technology race 
Implications 
for Green 
Climate 
Fund 
GCF resembles 
GEF 
 
GCF answerable to 
COP 
 
COP determines 
equitable allocation 
LCGF morphs into 
GCF: legitimacy 
rises 
 
LCGF more a 
vertical fund for 
mitigation and 
technology transfer: 
sub-set of GCF 
remit 
Less voice  
 
Limited role as 
operating entity: 
most funds through 
private channels 
 
Challenge of 
counting ‘new and 
additional’ resources 
under GCF 
GCF primarily as 
operating entity for 
adaptation/capacity-
building financing 
 
Reduced role of GCF 
in mitigation 
Source: Author. 
 
                                                     
14 Copenhagen Accord, 18 December 2009, para. 8. 
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The Accord also states that the GCF will be established as an operating entity of the financial 
mechanism under the UNFCCC. It is expected to fund projects, programmes, policies, and other 
activities related to mitigation (including REDD-plus), adaptation, capacity-building, and 
technology development and transfer.15 The GCF needs a COP decision to be established but, as 
an operating entity, it can be housed elsewhere.16 The question is how far different design 
options will fulfil alternative priorities for raising funds, allocating them, monitoring flows and 
activities, and giving contributors and recipients a say in its governance. 
Option A: Consolidate and specialise 
This option prioritises two governance concerns: more voice or decision-making power for 
beneficiary countries, and coordination among existing institutions. It will have four key 
elements. 
• No new institutions: Instead of creating more institutions, better co-ordination between 
existing institutions will be the norm. Of course, this is exactly what the GEF was 
supposed to do (a tripartite arrangement between UNDP, UNEP, and the World Bank). 
The difference is that, in this case, the funds promised will be significantly greater and 
will be linked to a compliance mechanism under the UNFCCC. The various institutions 
could also specialise in funding particular sectors or activities to reduce overlaps in 
mandates and programmes. The resources counted under this mechanism could be all of 
the $100bn promised under the Copenhagen Accord. In that case, the share of private 
financing would have to be agreed because it will be less predictable, depending on 
market conditions. Alternatively, a smaller but guaranteed sum from public sources could 
be counted (there are many ideas for raising these resources).17 These funds will be 
channelled through MDBs and UN agencies only (bilateral channels will not be 
permitted). 
• Reform MDBs: The other difference with current arrangements will be much greater 
voice for beneficiary countries in all funding channels. This means not only 
representation on the governing boards of funds but also voting rules that do not 
discriminate against beneficiaries (i.e. no double majority voting). Consultations with 
beneficiaries and stakeholders will take place in designing the funds, not just for discrete 
projects. Public-private investment vehicles will also give representation to countries that 
are intended targets for investments.  
• Aim for budget support: In order to reduce transaction costs for contributing countries 
and increase voice for beneficiaries, attempts will be made to provide more programmatic 
and budget support rather than focusing only on projects. For this arrangement to be 
credible, reporting and transparency will be critical and monitoring capacity will have to 
be increased in beneficiary countries. 
• MRV by specialised bodies with UNFCCC reviews: Instead of each MDB and UN 
agency adopting its own monitoring and evaluation criteria, common reporting formats 
will be devised. The reporting will be directed to the UNFCCC rather than the MDB, so 
that information on all funding allocations is collected at a centralised location. A 
technical committee at the UNFCCC will then independently verify the allocations and 
report to its political principals. The UNFCCC will undertake a political review (not just a 
                                                     
15 Ibid., para. 10. 
16 Rajamani (2010). 
17 These include auctioning international permits (Norway’s proposal), levies on aviation and maritime 
transport (LDC proposal), taxes on international financial transactions (India’s proposal), and selling IMF 
bonds in global markets, among others. 
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technical one) of contributing countries fulfilling their funding commitments. Even if a 
formal compliance procedure is not in place, independent reporting, verification, and 
review of financial flows will be a step change from the current opaque arrangements in 
place. 
• Disadvantage – innovative finance is limited: This option satisfies beneficiaries’ 
demand for voice and contributors’ preference for funding through existing channels. As 
a result, it maintains a plethora of different institutions that would be involved in climate 
financing. It is unlikely that such a design will stimulate innovative financing models to 
raise private capital, which require a long time horizon, more stable carbon prices, and 
more flexible monitoring provisions. Here, innovative financing mainly refers to new 
private funding sources or ways to leverage public funds for greater private investments. 
Notwithstanding the potential to raise additional funding from public sources (such as 
aviation or maritime levies, green bonds, auctioning emission allowances, etc.), the scale 
of the effort still requires significant private financing.  Even with greatly improved co-
ordination among MDBs and other agencies, there will be bureaucratic obstacles and 
mixed regulatory signals, which undermine private investments. Also, if private sources 
of finance are capped or bilateral funding is not counted, then the climate regime’s 
finance mechanism will have a lesser share of new funding streams flowing through it. 
• Implication for Green Climate Fund: By not creating any new institutions, under this 
option the GCF will look more like the GEF. The expectation would be that co-ordination 
between multiple funds (serving as implementing agencies) will improve. More 
importantly, by establishing MRV and reviews under the UNFCCC, the GCF will be 
directly answerable to the COP. The allocation of funds for different projects can be 
determined by technical committees, but the COP will deliberate on the overall balance of 
financial flows between mitigation, adaptation, capacity-building, and technology 
transfer. 
Option B: Create and legitimise 
Like Option A, this option also relies largely on public funding, but aims to create a wholly new 
global fund that would increase the legitimacy of any deal on climate finance in the 
international negotiations. The governance priorities here are both the scale of funding as well 
as increasing the voice of developing countries in the management of such a fund. However, the 
tension between scale and voice is expected to remain. 
• New low-carbon global fund: A dedicated new facility – the Low Carbon Global Fund 
(LCGF) – will be charged with mobilising resources and building capacity to cover the 
incremental cost of achieving specified GHG reduction goals.18 ‘Incremental’ would be 
defined as costs over and above those envisaged in current energy strategies, with an 
explicit target of lowering the emissions trajectory of beneficiary countries. Detailed 
metrics and verification procedures would be developed to compare current emission 
pathways with lower-carbon pathways, with the LCGF financing the costs of transition. 
In so doing, the model draws on the experience of the Montreal Protocol, whose 
membership increased once developing countries were guaranteed a fund that would 
cover their costs. 
• Legitimacy via increased voice: Developing countries are unlikely to accept a 
governance and decision-making structure dominated by rich countries. Even with 
modified governance rules for the numerous trust funds, major developing countries are 
                                                     
18 For a similar proposal for a Low Carbon Technology and Finance Facility, see Ghosh and Watkins 
(2009). 
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unlikely to accept MDB-led financing schemes. But for developed countries the 
legitimacy of the UNFCCC will hinge critically on perceptions of its capacity for 
overseeing compliance. The proposed LCGF will be overseen by a separate Executive 
Board comprising equal numbers of developed and developing countries, with additional 
representation of civil society and private sector representatives. The Executive Board 
will be headed by a respected international figure. MDBs will have only specialised 
operational tasks, such as assistance in data collection, analysis, and framing country 
programmes. 
• Legitimacy via upfront commitments: The new global fund will secure upfront 
financing commitments in five-year tranches, as has been the case with the GAVI 
Alliance. Further, following the example of the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis, eligibility for direct access to financing will be determined through a three-
step process. First, developing countries will estimate the financing requirements of 
moving towards their own national mitigation targets. The incremental costs will be over 
and above current plans for efficiency gains. Second, the proposals will be submitted to a 
technical panel constituted under the LCGF, which will make recommendations to the 
Executive Board for the release of finance. Third, resources will either be released 
promptly if the proposal is accepted or withheld subject to further clarification if there is a 
negative vote. 
• Programmatic support with flexible project funding: The primary role of the LCGF 
will be to tap into public financing to subsidise and/or insure the upfront capital 
expenditure for low-carbon transition programmes. Countries vary in the type of finance 
and support they require. As with the new agricultural fund (the GAFSP), funding support 
could be provided through parallel public and private funding windows. Low-income 
countries are likely to need highly concessional finance, including grants. For middle-
income countries, especially those with high levels of private investment in the energy 
sector, trade finance and commercial risk mitigation through loan guarantees, insurance, 
and other instruments may be more relevant. For energy utilities, whether public or 
private, subsidised risk insurance, advance payment guarantees, and performance bonds 
can significantly reduce the costs of construction and technology. This is an area in which 
the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation has extensive experience. One 
option might be for the IFC to manage the subsidy element in commercial risk provision. 
• MRV by specialised, public-private agencies: Any system that develops metrics for 
plant performance and not financial transfers would not be credible in the eyes of 
developing countries. Any system that measures and reports financial flows and not the 
efficiency of new plants would not get the support of developed countries. Only a 
partnership model of joint implementation and monitoring can satisfy the demands and 
concerns of all groups of countries. In order to increase the legitimacy of the process, the 
services of independent private auditors can also be used (a recent example was the use of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers for tracking and auditing relief funding after the 2005 Indian 
Ocean tsunami). 
• Disadvantage – political feasibility declines with funding requirements: The main 
disadvantage of this model is that, in the middle of a severe economic crisis, it is unlikely 
that contributing countries will make upfront financial commitments of sufficient scale. 
The Montreal Protocol, under which financial requirements were much smaller, suffered 
shortfalls within three years of commencing operations. Even the use of innovative 
public-private mechanisms, under the GAVI Alliance, for instance, has not generated a 
lot of funds compared with the needs. In seeking to strike a balance between greater voice 
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and greater funding, the legitimacy of the Low Carbon Global Fund will always be 
contingent on wider economic and political conditions.  
• Implication for Green Climate Fund: If a Low Carbon Global Fund were to morph into 
the Green Climate Fund, it would perhaps have the greatest legitimacy among a majority 
of UNFCCC parties. To be sure, the Copenhagen Accord explicitly seeks funding from a 
mix of public and private sources as well as multilateral and bilateral channels. Therefore, 
the LCGF will probably only serve as a sub-set of the overall financing mechanism under 
the UNFCCC. That said, the LCGF has the advantage of leveraging upfront public funds 
for greater sums of private investment. Its decision-making structure also offers voice to 
developing countries while MRV by independent, private agencies could increase 
confidence among contributing countries. There is a danger, however, that the LCGF will 
be viewed more as a vertical fund focused on mitigation and transfer of specific 
technologies. If that were to happen, then the GCF’s commitment to adaptation and 
capacity-building could be called into question. 
Option C: Innovate and de-bureaucratise 
In this option, the priority is to significantly increase the scale of funding to ensure that climate 
financing is adequate for the purpose. Conversely, the other priority is to reduce administrative 
barriers to increasing the flow of resources.  
• New innovative mechanisms: The model here will rely much more on innovative 
market-based financing mechanisms. These could include upfront financing from public 
sources to stimulate investments in cleaner technologies (or what is called Advanced 
Market Commitments), green bonds issued by the IMF,19 programmatic CDM, integrated 
carbon markets, etc. Whatever the mix of funding sources, a likely outcome will be a 
much reduced share of public financing though a potentially large pot of money for 
beneficiaries. 
• MDBs part of the mix, but face competition: MDBs and UN agencies will not be 
replaced; some are already in the process of creating innovative funds. But they will no 
longer be the primary or default managers for climate financing. Instead they will have to 
compete with several other possible modes, such as bilateral public-public technology 
partnerships, regional or plurilateral public-private arrangements, private-private 
transactions via voluntary carbon markets, etc. Thanks to such competition, these 
agencies will also have to streamline bureaucratic procedures for funding approvals, 
implementation, monitoring, and verification. 
• Programmatic support possible but mostly projects: Although programmatic and 
budget support can be conceived under this model, the dominant modality will be for 
projects. Funds will flow to countries and projects that are able to offer quick returns or 
guarantee markets or minimum prices for longer-term investments. 
• MRV largely by market actors: In order to reduce transaction costs, the burden of 
monitoring and verifying projects will fall on private actors. Either this will be done by 
project developers themselves or jointly with investors or by specialised third-party 
verifiers. The point is that the stability of the markets will depend on the credibility of 
projects operating in particular jurisdictions. It will be up to the investors to ensure that 
offset credits are credible.20 
                                                     
19 Bredenkamp and Pattillo (2010). The Green Fund could be partly financed by the issuance of additional 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).  
20 For more on a buyer liability system, see Keohane and Raustiala (2008). 
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• Disadvantage – UN-centred governance declines: As is evident, this model will not 
appeal to many developing countries because of the reduced role of the UNFCCC. There 
will be little guarantee of the actual amount of money available (contingent on economic 
conditions) or an equitable allocation of resources to small and large developing countries 
(contingent on a UN-led process). UNFCCC members will also have less oversight over 
financial flows and, consequently, little leverage over contributors to comply with 
funding commitments. The only reason why countries might still accept this option is if 
the upside of scale of funding is significantly large. In numerical terms, the projections 
would have to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. In governance terms, some form 
of public finance guarantee for a minimum amount of funding per year might be 
necessary. 
• Disadvantage – adaptation funding suffers: The other downside is that market-based 
mechanisms do not offer funding at scale for adaptation. There are signs that private 
sector funding for adaptation could be leveraged (for instance, through micro-finance 
products) but a number of institutional preconditions will have to be fulfilled. Further, if 
most governance functions are relegated to market participants, climate regime members 
will have little influence in pressing for more funds to be channelled to adaptation 
activities. One could argue that the Adaptation Fund’s resources could increase (with 
levies on CDM and perhaps other carbon market transactions). Given the experience so 
far, however, this will be a big risk for highly vulnerable countries and communities to 
shoulder. 
• Implication for Green Climate Fund: Under this design option, the Green Climate 
Fund will not fulfil its objectives of balanced representation or allocation of resources 
between countries or between different types of climate-related activities. The GCF’s role 
as an operating entity will also be limited since most of the funds will flow through 
private channels. To the extent that MDBs will be part of the funding mix, the GCF could 
co-ordinate their activities. The most difficult challenge for the GCF will be counting 
‘new and additional’ resources, depending on how it treats carbon market transactions or 
purely private sector-led investment flows. If parties can agree on a baseline and a 
formula to count private funds, then the potential scale of funding under this option might 
still give the GCF some credibility under the UNFCCC. 
Option D: Separate and indigenise 
The fourth model squarely confronts the shifting power trajectories in climate negotiations and 
in investments in the development of clean technology. Its focus is on prioritising actions now 
rather than later by leveraging what leading economies are doing already. Although this makes 
it a variant of option C, its other distinguishing priority is to significantly increase funding for 
adaptation. This option might appeal to rich and emerging economies, reducing the former’s 
public financing obligations and allowing the latter to secure finance and technology-based 
bilateral and plurilateral deals with rich countries. For the poorest economies, a legally binding 
financing commitment on adaptation might also be an attraction. 
• No overarching financing mechanism: Negotiations on an overarching vertically 
integrated finance mechanism have continued for a long time. For various reasons 
discussed in this paper (fiscal pressure, economic uncertainty, governance failures, 
conflicting priorities), there is no reason to expect that a new mechanism will be agreed 
soon or, if it is, will generate sufficient resources within a short period of time. Instead, 
like Option A, the preference here will be to better co-ordinate the work of existing funds. 
What is different, however, is that the regime will draw a clear distinction between 
mitigation and adaptation and will be structured accordingly. It will not try to govern both 
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through a single mechanism and risk adaptation becoming a lesser priority. At the same 
time, a separate focus on mitigation will prioritise the environmental integrity purpose of 
the climate regime, namely stabilising, sequestering, storing, and reducing GHG 
emissions in order to keep average temperature increases to less than 2ºC. 
• Self-reliance and innovative finance: In pursuit of the mitigation goals, the regime will 
recognise that a large portion of funds will have to flow to large developing countries, 
where the emissions reduction potential is the greatest. It will also recognise that these 
countries are now at the forefront of investing in R&D and capacity for cleaner 
technologies. The substantial resources that these countries have already committed 
(through subsidies, stimulus packages, etc.) and are planning to commit through their 
national plans on climate change should be a signal of their seriousness. In turn, 
innovative finance will flow towards these countries through private-private 
collaborations or public-private arrangements. This does not absolve rich countries from 
their responsibility to contribute funds. Instead, it creates a clear market opportunity to 
devote funds in those countries that offer the scale to develop new technologies and 
generate the greatest returns on investments. 
• MDBs (and bilateral funds) play an important role in underwriting risk: Existing 
funding institutions will increasingly play a facilitating role rather than directly investing 
in projects. That role will focus on underwriting project risk, offering concessional trade 
finance for the flow of environmental goods and technologies, covering insurance costs, 
etc. They could also offer upfront guarantees to stimulate greater private sector 
investments. 
• Adaptation funding with legal commitments under UNFCCC: Meanwhile, rich 
countries will undertake legally binding commitments to provide adaptation finance. 
These funds will be deposited with the Adaptation Fund and its Board will determine the 
allocation of resources based on some formula (say, based on potentially vulnerable 
population, incidence of natural disasters, levels of poverty, etc.). Non-compliance with 
these commitments will be reviewed by the UNFCCC. Sanctions could take the form of 
an allocation of the contributing country’s share of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) 
to the Adaptation Fund until it provides the money. Each contributing country will be free 
to devise its own fund-raising scheme (auctioning permits, taxing fossil fuels, etc.). Each 
beneficiary country will develop indigenous plans for adaptation. By separating 
adaptation and mitigation, this model also has the advantage of reducing potential 
domestic political obstacles to transfers of money to competitor developing countries. At 
the same time, large, developing countries will also partake of adaptation funding since 
they, too, have large vulnerable populations. 
• MRV depends on robust domestic capacity: For large developing countries to attract 
more investments in cleaner technologies, they will also need to improve their domestic 
monitoring and enforcement capacity. This means not only federal-level institutions but 
strengthening governance at the provincial and local levels as well. The use of satellite 
technology will also be crucial to monitor emission sources and target investments where 
the maximum returns can be expected. 
• Disadvantage – small countries lose out on technology: Despite its political feasibility, 
the main disadvantage of this model is that many small countries might lose out in the 
technological race. The fear of a widening technology divide (already driven by the 
concentration of mitigation projects or patents in just a few countries) will be exacerbated 
if there is no multilateral mechanism to guarantee the sharing of new technology. The 
Copenhagen Accord envisages a Technology Mechanism and the Indian government has 
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proposed creating a network of innovation centres. However, past experience in the 
climate regime does not offer reason for optimism. If this model were to be pursued, the 
climate regime will need a better strategy for ensuring technology transfer than has been 
attempted so far.  
• Implication for Green Climate Fund: Here, the GCF would become the operating 
entity primarily for adaptation-related funding. Compared with past experience, this in 
itself will be a major responsibility and a source of legitimacy under the UNFCCC. 
Funding for capacity-building could also conceivably be channelled through the GCF. 
Contributing and recipient countries will continue to have a say in the allocation of these 
funds, which will be reviewed both at the national level and by the COP. However, the 
GCF will have a much reduced role in mitigation if this option is followed. It might still 
have a role in technology transfer if funds are earmarked for that purpose and dedicated 
for the poorest countries, although it is unclear whether guaranteed public funds will be 
made available. 
5. Conclusion 
Climate finance is due for an upheaval. For far too long, parties to the climate regime have 
tinkered with funds and facilities, spending years negotiating over miniscule resources that 
come nowhere close to meeting the global challenge. In reality, the concern has been less over 
the scale of resources and more over who gets to control, collect, disburse, and monitor them. 
Put differently, the governance of finance is a major stumbling block to securing international 
co-operation on climate change. This situation is unsustainable. 
The institutional design options offered here are far from ideal, but they offer a change from the 
status quo. In an imperfect world, the pursuit of ideal-type solutions can only delay action. As 
power shifts in climate negotiations, it is important to find ways to ensure that leading countries 
do not exit the playing field entirely, leaving the smaller players with neither money nor 
technology. The GCF, promised under the Copenhagen Accord, might suffer a similar fate if 
parties do not recognise the trade-offs between voice, co-ordination, scale, and the different 
kinds of actions that are necessary to confront climate change. The different design options here 
offer some gains to all parties. The upshot: compromises will be necessary, but they will have to 
be honest and upfront if a modicum of trust has to be restored in climate negotiations. And the 
best must not become the enemy of the good. 
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